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KIDS WILL BE KIDS: TIME FOR A “REASONABLE
CHILD” STANDARD FOR THE PROOF OF
OBJECTIVE MENS REA ELEMENTS
Christopher Northrop and Kristina Rothley Rozan*
I. INTRODUCTION
When a juvenile1 is charged with a criminal offense, it is the prosecutor’s and
the defender’s goals to prove and disprove, respectively, the mens rea element of the
alleged crime. The lowest level of criminal culpability—negligence—typically
establishes the “reasonable person” as the reference point for the prosecutor and the
defender to use as to whether the child is to be held criminally responsible. For
example, according to the Model Penal Code (hereinafter “MPC”), a person is
negligent when his failure to perceive a particular substantial and unjustifiable risk
“involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor's situation.”2 Some states’ criminal statutes not only make
reference to a “reasonable person” standard in their definition of negligence, but also
in their definition of recklessness, the next higher level on the spectrum of
culpability. For example, in Maine, a person is reckless when their conscious
disregard of a risk involves “a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation.” 3
Under tort law, a child accused of negligence receives special consideration
unless certain exceptions apply. According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a
person negligently caused harm if they did not exercise “reasonable care under all
circumstances.”4 For an adult defendant, in many cases it is sufficient for the factfinder to consider only the harm’s foreseeable likelihood and severity, and whether
the defendant took precautions to eliminate or reduce its risk.5 However, in cases
involving children, “the inquiry into reasonable care . . . requires attention to
considerations or circumstances that supplement or somewhat subordinate the

* Christopher Northrop is a clinical professor the University of Maine School of Law, where he
launched its Juvenile Justice Clinic in 2006. Prior to joining Maine Law, Professor Northrop spent many
years in private practice, concentrating on juvenile defense work. He has been involved with the National
Juvenile Defender Center (NJDC) since its inception, and has served as a consultant for NJDC
assessments of statewide juvenile defender systems in a number of states. Chris helped NJDC develop its
Juvenile Training Immersion Program and its National Juvenile Defense Standards.
Kristina R. Rozan, Esq., is licensed to practice law in Maine. She is a recent graduate of the University
of Maine School of Law, and holds a PhD from Yale University. At Maine Law, she worked with juvenile
clients in the Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic. The views expressed in this article are the authors' alone and
do not represent the opinions of any other organization or persons. All of Ms. Rozan's contributions
occurred while she was a student.
1. Our definition of juvenile is any person who has not attained the age of 18.
2. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Am. L. Inst. 2015).
3. 17-A M.R.S.A § 35(3)(c) (effective Sept. 20, 2007).
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. d. (2010).
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primary factors,”6 including the actor’s age, intelligence, and experience, unless the
child was engaged in a dangerous activity “characteristically undertaken by adults.”7
Further, children less than five years of age are categorically presumed to be
incapable of negligence under tort law. 8
Criminal law statutes make no similar special accommodations for children
accused of negligence offenses, nor do they specify which characteristics of the
accused must or even may be attributed to the reasonable person against which
evidence of an actor’s mental state is to be compared.9 The drafters of the MPC
provided minimal guidance in characteristics that might not undermine the
objectivity of the reasonable person standard, such as whether the accused was “blind
or if he had just suffered a blow or experienced a heart attack.”10 But, they warn that
“the heredity, intelligence or temperament of the actor would . . . depriv[e] the
criterion of all its objectivity.” 11
Instead, it has been left to the courts to decide whether the reasonable person in
a criminal statute takes on personal characteristics of the defendant,12 and the
consequences for juvenile defendants have been decidedly mixed. Some courts have
viewed this opportunity for discretion, rather, as an inappropriate step into the
prerogative of the legislature. For example, in State v. Heinemann, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut upheld a trial court’s instruction that the defendant’s age could
be used to differentiate him from those threatening him when considering a duress
defense,13 but a requested instruction that his age was also a permissible factor to
determine how he would have perceived the threat—regardless of the age of his
alleged coercers—was rejected as it would “essentially would require this court to
rewrite the entire Penal Code.”14 Conversely, the Court of Appeals of Alaska opined
that holding juveniles to an adult standard of care for conversations that result in
another person committing a crime would effectuate an inappropriate “broad and
major change in the law” whereby juveniles would frequently be held to an adult
standard of care.15
Notwithstanding these recent inconsistencies in line drawing by individual
courts,16 overall substantive criminal law continues to rely on adult standards of mens
rea as the appropriate calibration of adolescent guilt. 17 Without express guidance to
do otherwise, fact-finders anchor their judgment of a juvenile’s culpability in their
own adult decision making processes. 18 The result is that we are finding children
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 3(c).
9. Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law: Fighting the Lernaean
Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2010).
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 242 (2015).
11. Id.
12. Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1436.
13. State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278, 295 (Conn. 2007).
14. Id. at 297.
15. J.R. v. State, 62 P.3d 114, 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
16. Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1437.
17. Jenny E. Carroll, Brain Science and the Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 94 N.C. L. REV. 539, 590
(2016)
18. Id.
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criminally responsible for not behaving like reasonable adults. This standard is
highly inappropriate and perhaps even irrelevant. Given what science tells us about
the functioning of children’s brains19 and what the Supreme Court has said in several
recent, high profile cases about juvenile culpability, 20 it unfairly draws youth into
the juvenile system.
Inappropriate prosecution of children for any reason, including reliance on an
improper reasonable person standard, is perilous to the individuals and to society. 21
First, juvenile system processing of any kind 22 can have lifelong consequences. In
the short term, when we label certain acts as “deviant” and treat kids who commit
them as “outsiders,” we may actually perpetuate the delinquent behavior. 23 In the
long term, records of juvenile adjudications can negatively affect educational,
employment, housing, and military opportunities, and be used in adult criminal
sentencing.24 Second, it perverts the criminal and juvenile law systems when we
hold anyone criminally responsible and, subsequently, punish them in error.
Delinquency is committed by almost every youth at some point in time 25 and, after a
period of occasional offending, most youth discontinue their delinquent behavior. 26
Third, the way we define criminal culpability has an enormous impacts. In 2009
there were over 1.5 million delinquency cases, and 33% of all these cases resulted in
either adjudications of delinquency or transfers to adult criminal court.27 In some
urban areas, there is an extreme prevalence of police and court involvement with
youth. A 2004 study in Denver found that 73% of males and 43% of females had
been arrested by age 18.28
Based on the goals of the juvenile system, significant advances in adolescent
development research and recent Supreme Court holdings on juvenile culpability,
we argue here that the juvenile code should be amended to explicitly refer to a
reasonable child standard for any mens rea element that relies on a reasonable person
as the measure for criminal culpability. In Part II, we provide an overview of mens
19. See infra notes 27-69 and accompanying text
20. See infra notes 70-103 and accompanying text
21. See The Ctr. on Juv. and Crim. Just., Diversion Programs: An Overview,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html (last visited March 19, 2016).
22. Juvenile justice processing may include arrest (police contact that resulted in referral to the
prosecutor or court intake), police custody, detention, diversion, adjudication, deferred disposition,
conditions of release, restitution, community service, court appearances, meetings with corrections
officers, mandated counseling and program participation, probation, and confinement. See Statistical
Briefing
Book,
Juvenile
Justice
System
Structure
and
Process,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/case.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
23. Diversion Programs: An Overview, supra note 21.
24. Julie Ellen McConnell, Five Devastating Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Delinquency
Adjudications You Should Know Before You Represent a Child, 61 VA. LAW. 34, 34 (2012).
25. Data from Denver between 1987 and 1996 show that each year 47-70% of juveniles committed
delinquent acts. David Huizinga et al., The Effect of Juvenile Justice System Processing on Subsequent
Delinquent
and
Criminal
Behavior:
A
Cross-National
Study,
at
49
(2004)
(https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/205001.pdf).
26. Id. at 48.
27. Of the 1,500,000 delinquency cases in the United States in 2004, 488,800 resulted in adjudications
of delinquency and over 8,000 others were transferred to criminal courts. Charles Puzzanchera et al.,
Juvenile Court Statistics 2009, NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE at 7, 45, 48 (2012),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239114.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2016).
28. Huizinga et al., supra note 25, at 2.
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rea, including why it is an element in crimes, how it is used and defined, what the
courts have said about who the reasonable person is or can be, who the factfinders
think the reasonable person is, and how reasonableness is proven or disproven. We
also briefly summarize recent scientific research about the juvenile brain and how
can we use this information to construct a “reasonable child” standard. In Part III,
we discuss the Supreme Court’s holdings on juvenile culpability and argue why they
should also apply to proof of the elements for the case in chief. In Part IV, we explain
why a reasonable child standard supports of the goals of the juvenile justice system.
In Part V, we consider options as to how to change the reasonable person standard
to a reasonable child standard. In Part VI, we conclude that, from this point forward,
a reasonable child standard should always be used as the reference for proof of
objective mens rea elements for juveniles, and that legislative amendments to current
criminal and juvenile statutes are the best way to achieve this.
II. MENS REA, THE REASONABLE PERSON, AND SCIENCE
The purpose of the mens rea element in the definition of crimes is to support the
legitimacy of the criminal law system.29 While there are an infinite number of ways
in which people harm each other or jeopardize the health, safety, welfare, and morals
of others, we have agreed as a society to generally only hold persons criminally
responsible when they commit these acts with intent, knowledge, or some minimum
level of carelessness.30 In other words, the mens rea element provides the factfinder
with a mechanism to distinguish between when someone has simply stumbled over
a dog and when they have kicked a dog. 31 This concept may be relatively
straightforward to appreciate but has proved more subtle and challenging in practice.
A philosophical split has emerged. One approach to mens rea is to define it in terms
of the “evil,” “wanton,” or “malicious” state of mind of the perpetrator.32 Another
approach, as adopted by the MPC, removes the moral judgment from the analysis
and focuses instead on the intention of the accused.33 Rather than choosing one or
the other, most jurisdictions have instead combined these approaches in unique ways
such that it is now possible to identify twelve distinct mens rea terms used by the
states and federally.34 Mens rea is a fluid concept that shifts with changing social
norms and expectations.35
Negligence, generally described as a significant deviation from an acceptable
29. Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness of the Criminal Law?,
29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 21-22 (2001).
30. There are also strict liability crimes, but they are discouraged. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600, 606 (1994); Model Penal Code §2.02.
31. We are alluding to the famous observation by Justice Holmes that “even a dog distinguishes the
difference between being stumbled over and being kicked.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
32. Miller, supra note 29, at 22.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 26. Miller goes on to list twelve levels of mens rea: premeditation, willful, intentional, the
requisite mental state to perform a felony dangerous to human life, the requisite mental state to perform a
felony not dangerous to human life, intent to perform a criminal act clouded by loss of mental stability,
knowledge, reckless, negligent, negligent based on relationship, strict liability, and absolute liability. Id.
at 39-43.
35. Carroll, supra note 17, at 548.
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standard,36 frequently is defined with a combination of subjective and objective
elements. The MPC only asks the factfinder to evaluate if it was the purely
subjective, “conscious object” of the actor to cause a particular result in deciding
whether they acted “purposefully.”37 But whether a person acted “negligently”
depends both subjectively on whether “he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk” and whether his failure to perceive the risk involved an objective
“gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
in the actor's situation.”38 Aside from some suggestions in the commentary, 39 the
drafters do not provide guidance on who this reasonable person should be.
Adult and juvenile courts struggle with how to measure this reasonable person.
Part of the difficulty in defining the reasonable person has been a lack of consensus
on the purpose for our criminal justice system. 40 Retribution is a dominant and
ubiquitous justification for sanctioning dangerous behaviors that cause harm to
others.41 When we convict a person based an objective reasonable person standard,
we are punishing them for their failure to meet our expectations of caution. Another
prevalent justification for criminal justice is deterrence. 42 In convicting an
individual for behaving unreasonably, we seek both to impress upon him the
desirability of a future, law-abiding existence, and to discourage all citizens from
committing crimes.43 It is disputable whether the courts or the legislatures can craft
a generic “reasonable person” standard that is attainable to both the individual
standing before the court, and to all persons referring to this statute or precedent for
guidance for their behavior. Indeed, prominent scholars44 have argued that negligent
behavior should be entirely excluded from criminal liability, in part because “the
confusion of the ‘external’ standard of the ‘reasonable man’ employed in the method
of proof with the standard of liability required by mens rea [has] given rise to
decisions of very dubious validity.”45
Rather than renouncing culpability for negligent acts entirely, courts have
acknowledged the impropriety of applying a single, generic reasonable person
standard to all defendants by allowing factfinders to incorporate limited variations
of this reference point. Courts start with an objective reasonable person standard,
then allow introduction of evidence that may justify dangerous behaviors of a
particular defendant. For example, in the famous Goetz case, the court held it was
proper that Mr. Goetz’s “reasonable belief” about his “situation” could include the
physical attributes of the victims and defendant.46 This approach is not always
successful. In State v. Norman, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the
36. Miller, supra note 29, at 42.
37. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a) (2015)
38. Id. at § 2.02(2)(d) (emphasis added).
39. Id. at § 2.02.
40. Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1437.
41. The ‘Lectric Law Library, Retribution, http://www.lectlaw.com/mjl/cl062.htm (2015).
42. Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know about Criminal Deterrence, 100 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 765, 782 (2010).
43. Id.
44. See Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1438.
45. Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
632, 635 (1963).
46. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986).
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fact a woman suffered from battered woman syndrome was not relevant in
determining the reasonableness of her belief in the necessity to kill her abusive
husband.47
Similarly, in some juvenile adjudications, the courts have explicitly wrestled
with the “initial question [of] how this hypothetical reasonable person is to be
defined.”48 After examining the laws of civil negligence in Arizona and around the
country, the Court of Appeals of Arizona issued the narrow holding that it was the
legislature's intention for the reasonable person reference to be juveniles of like age,
intelligence, and experience for a fifteen-year-old charged with criminal recklessness
for riding a shopping cart in a parking lot and cases closely analogous. 49 However,
the Supreme Court of Connecticut held the age of a defendant charged with robbery
could only be considered a factor in evaluation of the objective component—did the
defendant’s age, size and strength make him more vulnerable to physical threats—
of a duress defense. The jury was not allowed to consider the subjective component
– was the defendant’s moral temperament affected by his age.50 In In re A.A.M, the
Court of Appeals of Minnesota found that there was no case law or statutory
authority in Minnesota to support a reasonable juvenile standard for the element of
consent in a criminal-sexual-conduct case.51 In State v. Marshall, the Court of
Appeals of Washington presumed that because the Legislature established a
rebuttable presumption that children 8 to 12 years of age were incapable of
committing crimes, they intended for the “reasonable man in the same situation”
standard for manslaughter to apply to juveniles over 12.52 However, “the juvenile
status of a defendant is part of his situation and relevant to a determination of whether
he acted reasonably.”53 In In re Welfare of S.W.T., the Supreme Court of Minnesota
held that the culpable negligence of juveniles charged with aiding and abetting
manslaughter must be decided with reference to the conduct and appreciation of risk
reasonably to be expected from an ordinary and reasonably prudent juvenile of a
similar age.54 In J.R. v. State, the Court of Appeals of Alaska determined that to
sustain a charge of murder in the second degree, the question of whether a juvenile
defendant displayed a reckless disregard for life must be judged by whether his
conduct conformed to that of a reasonable juvenile. 55 In State v. Oaks, the Court of
Appeals of Arizona used an amendment to the state constitution about automatic
transfer of juveniles charged with certain crimes to adult criminal court to dictate the
use of an adult reasonable person standard at trial. This amendment required any
older juvenile accused of a violent crime to be “subject to the same laws as adults,”
which the court held to mean that a fifteen-year-old charged with aggravated assault
was properly measured against the standard of a reasonable person, and not that of a

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. 1989).
In re William G., 963 P.2d 287, 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.
State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278, 295 (Conn. 2007).
In re A.A.M., 684 N.W.2d 925, 928 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Marshall, 692 P.2d 855, 857 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
Id.
In re Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 514 (Minn. 1979).
J.R. v. State, 62 P.3d 114, 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).

116

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1

reasonable juvenile of similar age.56
Regardless of any differences between adult and juvenile courts in the features
of the accused that may or may not be ascribed to the reasonable person standard, or
how reasonableness is proven or disproven, the methods in which the state proves
the objective mens rea elements are similar. In both adult and juvenile court, absent
a person's outright admission regarding his state of mind, his mental state must
necessarily be ascertained by inference from all relevant surrounding
circumstances.57 Furthermore, there are no additional demands placed on the state
to prove their case when the accused is a juvenile. For example, in State v. Marshall,
the Court of Appeals of Washington held that the standard of conduct of a reasonable
15-year-old is an objective standard, “within the ken of the average fact finder, as is
the standard of conduct of a reasonable adult,” and, therefore, that expert testimony
was neither needed nor required.58
The most fundamental requirements of our criminal statutes are that they clearly
indicate when people have acted immorally, and that they are suitable and effective.59
Two principal ethical arguments are offered as to why negligent acts are immoral. 60
The first states that negligent actors exhibit such an indifference to social values that
they deserve punishment.61 The second, closer aligned with tort law, is that
negligent actors have violated their moral duty not to harm social values. 62 Despite
long-standing, vigorous debate over the validity of negligence as a crime, 63 the
ubiquity of criminal negligence statutes indicates our society’s general agreement on
the immorality of these acts. “Suitable” means that the level of the state’s response
to the act in terms of liberties taken and the intensiveness of rehabilitative efforts are
appropriate. “Effective” means that the statute has the desired individual and general
deterrence.
In the past, we have adjusted criminal statutes to satisfy these requirements
based on shifting social norms and policy changes. For example, the juvenile system
was initiated at the beginning of the 19th century by social reformers seeking a more
compassionate and rehabilitative path for delinquent youth who were being tried
similarly to adults, and then were indiscriminately confined with hardened adult
criminals and the mentally ill in large overcrowded and decrepit penal institutions.64
In the late 1980s, based on the splashy promotion of the “super-predator” archetype,
the public perception that juvenile crime was on the rise, and general fears that the
system was too lenient, many states adjusted their criminal laws towards a more
punitive goal, which included mandatory sentences and automatic adult court
transfer for certain crimes.65
56. State v. Oaks, 104 P.3d 163, 167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
57. See In re William G., 963 P.2d 287, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
58. 692 P.2d 855, 857 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
59. Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 Colum. L. Rev.
632, 636 (1963).
60. Id.at 637
61. Id.
62. Id. at 637-38.
63. Id.
64. Ctr.
for
Crim.
Juv.
&
Crim.
Just.,
Juvenile
Justice
History,
http://www.cjcj.org/education1/juvenile-justice-history.html.
65. Id.
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Today, significant advances in brain research offer contemporary bases for the
continued progression in the definition of criminal statutes. Our understanding about
the capacities and changes in the brain during adolescence can help us to re-craft
laws and their application to be more justifiable, fair, and effective. It has been a
regular tradition of our criminal system to adjust our definitions and concepts of
criminality to match shifting social norms and expectations, including concepts of
mens rea.66
With respect to need for statutes to define immoral acts, our society wishes to
punish persons who are indifferent to social norms. Unless an accused person
confesses to such indifference, the fact-finder relies on circumstantial evidence a
proof of indifference. 67 Brain research shows that juveniles are not aware of social
norms, and in fact engage in reward-seeking behaviors that may challenge social
norms as a normative part of their development. 68 Therefore, what appears as
careless indifference based on the standard of a reasonable adult is a normal and
essential part of the brain development of a reasonable juvenile. 69 This does not
mean kids should not be held responsible for harm that results from their negligence,
but that it is inappropriate to criminalize this behavior as being immoral.
Furthermore, according to the current language of the criminal statutes, negligence
culpability attaches when there is a gross deviation from the standard of care of a
reasonable person.70 Based on current science, it is normal and expected that
children as a class will take significantly less care than adults. 71 The options are,
then, to eliminate negligence culpability for children entirely or else to only
criminalize gross deviations from the standard of care that is to be expected for
reasonable children.
Considering negligence as the failure to satisfy a duty, brain research informs us
about the duties we can justly assign to juveniles and about their ability to satisfy
them. Brain research supports both the time-honored tradition of tort law to assign
duty as a function of age, and the age-basis on which we allow young persons to
assume responsibilities like voting, drinking alcohol, and driving a car. Simply by
virtue of their age, juveniles are less aware of their duty to others. They are also less
able to assess the risk that their actions might violate their duty to others.72
Therefore, a reasonable juvenile has less notice of her societal responsibilities and
less capacity to satisfy them. Thus, the brain research predicts that a substantial gap
between kids’ behavior and the fulfillment of adult duties to society is completely
normal.
Suitable criminal statutes result in punishment that is proportional to the
66. Carroll, supra note 17, at 553.
67. Id. at 558.
68. Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. at 30 as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) (citing Laurence Steinberg, A Behavioral
Scientist Looks at the Science of Adolescent Brain Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160, 162
(2010)).
69. Id. at 10 (citing Franklin Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL 271, 280 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds. 2000)).
70. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Am. L. Inst. 1985).
71. Brief of Am. Psychological Ass’n et al., supra note 68, at 7 (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless
Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 344 (1992)).
72. Id. at 10.
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seriousness of an offence. Brain research tells us that a juvenile’s deviation from an
adult reasonable standard of behavior is not the indicator of a “criminal mind” in the
same way that it might be for an adult. 73 And so carelessly damaging a car in a
parking lot with a shopping cart by an adult and by an child mean different things,
and we are less justified in describing that behavior as evil when done by a child.
Brain research can also help us to craft and apply statutes that have the desired
individual and general deterrence. Part of the role of the criminal statutes is to
provide notice to society of immoral acts. Indeed, the MPC’s drafters argue that
negligence liability is an effective deterrent because it motivates people to “use their
facilities and draw on their experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated
conduct,” such that they may take care before acting. 74 A child is even less likely to
have read the negligence statutes than an adult. Another role of criminal statutes is
to expressly record society’s well-known principles of right and wrong. The MPC
drafters further justify negligence culpability because they say it properly imputes a
“moral defect” to people who act out of insensitivity to the interests of others. But,
brain research tells us that juveniles lack an adult’s capacity for mature judgment. 75
The reasonable juvenile has less direct experience and less indirect general
knowledge. And, insensitivity to others, although perhaps reprehensible, is a typical
characteristic of children and not a moral defect.
In summary, brain research has tipped the scales in favor of consistently
adopting a reasonable child standard for all criminal statutes, and particularly for
negligence-level crimes. Whereas 10 years ago, based on the history of our legal
and tort systems and our layman’s understanding about children, decent arguments
could be made both ways. But now, the research says that it is inconceivable that
we should expect a child to behave like a reasonable adult. What the reasonable
adult would label as delinquency is actually normal and necessary behavior for kids.
III. SCOTUS SUPPORT FOR THE REASONABLE CHILD STANDARD
Since 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States has issued a handful of
opinions that have rocked the world of juvenile law. 76 In these opinions, the Court
combined the “commonsense reality” 77 of age with the latest brain science research
and what they termed as general characteristics of adolescents that “any parent
knows,”78 to prescribe separate treatment for children who are suspected or
convicted of crimes. As summarized by the Court, children often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them, they are more susceptible to outside influence, and their
character is still evolving.79 The Court concluded, therefore, that children as a class
73. Id. at 19.
74. The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries 243 (1985) (commenting on
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d)).
75. Brief of Am. Psychological Ass’n et al., supra note 68, at 13.
76. Elizabeth Scott, Thomas Grisso, Marsha Levick & Laurence Steinberg, The Supreme Court and
the
Transformation
of
Juvenile
Sentencing
(Sept.
30,
2015),
http://modelsforchange.net/publications/index.html
77. J.D.B. v. North. Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 265 (2011).
78. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
79. Id. at 569-70.
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are less criminally culpable than adults and should be accorded different sentencing
guidelines, even when convicted of the most heinous crimes. When performing the
custody analysis for Miranda rights during police interrogations, courts must now
take into account all of the relevant circumstances of the interrogation, including the
age of the suspect.
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court held Miranda cases involving kids require
special analysis because they are more likely than adults to make false confessions. 80
Indeed, the Court goes so far as to say that, in many cases, the evaluation of Miranda
cases would be nonsensical absent the consideration of age,81 and to ignore age
would be a cost to the juvenile’s constitutional rights. 82 All suspects in custody must
receive a reading of their Miranda rights before they are interrogated. The inquiry
as to whether the suspect was, in fact, in custody is purely objective with no
consideration of the suspect’s actual mindset. The first step in this inquiry is to
describe the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 83 The second is to ask,
given those circumstances, whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave. 84 The Court held that the suspect’s age impacts
the way we must address both of these steps.85 Police are required to examine all
circumstances, meaning any circumstance that would have affected how a reasonable
person “in the subject’s position” would perceive their situation. 86 A suspect’s
identity as a minor, according to the Court, cannot be disentangled from these
circumstances.87 Given that, as a class, children are less mature, less responsible,
and more vulnerable or susceptible to pressure, the Court declared the reference
against which to evaluate a suspect’s interpretation of their liberty is not a
“reasonable person,” but a “reasonable child.”88
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the death penalty is unconstitutional,
disproportionate punishment for juveniles. 89 Relying, in part, on the latest scientific
and sociological studies as confirmation of the traditional wisdom of parents, the
Court summarized that we can objectively conclude that juveniles possess the
qualities of immaturity, vulnerability, and a lack of true depravity. 90 Therefore,
“their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult,” even
when having committed the most heinous crimes. 91 They are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influence, outside pressures, including peer pressure, and
psychological damage. And, their lack of maturity results in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions, and lowers the likelihood of their taking any costbenefit analysis. Hence, the death penalty is less likely to serve as a means of
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J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 269.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 281.
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
J.D.B., 564 at 270.
Id. at 276.
Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112.
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Id. at 271-72.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
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Id. at 561.
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deterrence than it would for adults. 92
In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders is a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.93 Age should be a factor in the analysis of the severity of
sentencing, reasoned the Court, because it affects the severity of the punishment—a
juvenile spending their life in prison will be committed for a larger proportion of
their life than an adult94—and the rehabilitative potential of the offender (which is
greater for children). Life without parole for non-homicide juveniles also does not
serve the legitimate penological goals of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. 95
Referring to Roper, the Court noted that juvenile offenders categorically have
diminished moral culpability.96 The Court also reviewed legislative enactments and
actual sentencing practices in the United States and internationally to determine that
there is a general consensus against the sentencing of non-homicide juveniles to life
without parole.97
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that mandatory life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional. 98 A judge’s or jury’s lack of sentencing
discretion based on the convicted juvenile’s youth and its attendant characteristics,
along with the nature of his crime, would be, according to the Court, inconsistent
with their “lessened culpability” and greater “capacity for change.” 99 The Court
reasoned that the categorical bans on certain punishments for being disproportionate
when applied to juveniles announced in Roper and Graham, and the requirement that
sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of
his offense before sentencing him to death initiated in Woodson, lead to the
conclusion that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the
Eighth Amendment.100 Note that in Montgomery, the Court declared that Miller's
prohibition on mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders announced a new
substantive rule that, under the Constitution, must be retroactive. 101
While the holdings of these cases pertain only to the delivery of Miranda
warnings and sentencing, the justification and reasoning which form their bases
broadly apply to the characteristics of juveniles as a class that are unquestionably
relevant to the state’s proof of its case in chief in a juvenile adjudication. The most
fundamental principle in our criminal justice system is that we only burden the
liberties of those who are criminally culpable. 102 Beginning with Roper and then
again in Graham, J.D.B., and Miller, the Court repeatedly and forcibly proclaims
that a juvenile’s irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an
adult. If a child’s culpability is lower even when having committed a heinous
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crime,103 then it is unquestionably lower for negligence offenses, the least villainous
crimes. Given that the “reasonable person” is the standard by which we assess
criminal negligence, the Court’s broad proclamations on reduced juvenile culpability
prevail upon us to include childhood as a characteristic of the reasonable person
reference.
These Supreme Court holdings speak to the suitability of criminal negligence
statutes as applied to children. As is discussed and undertaken in Miller, it is
appropriate to regularly review the match between culpability and potential
penalties. And as observed in Graham, the lower age of a juvenile defendant can
exaggerate the liberties taken from someone convicted—or adjudicated—of a crime.
Specifically, the records of a youth’s involvement with the juvenile justice system
often remain available indefinitely, creating obstacles as they seek employment,
education, housing, and other opportunities.104 It is doubtful that anyone would
argue a child convicted or simply accused of criminal negligence is deserving of a
lifetime stigma. Furthermore, these obstacles can directly interfere with any
rehabilitative services initiated by the judicial or executive branches of the
government as they attempt to guide a negligent child back toward a more productive
and law-abiding path. In J.D.B., the Court notes that all American jurisdictions
accept the idea that age is a relevant circumstance in negligence suits. 105
These Court opinions also enjoin us to carefully reconsider the effectiveness of
criminal negligence statutes with respect to individual and general deterrence. As
indicated in Roper, children cannot and do not engage in the same cost-benefit
analysis as adults.106 They are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influence
and outside pressures, including peer pressure. Hence, they are much less likely to
be dissuaded to act either because of the knowledge that an act is deemed illegal and
unfavored by society, or because of the potential consequences of that act.
While it might be raised that these Supreme Court holdings are highly applicable
to the subjective intent or knowledge of an individual defendant, as they clearly are,
the Court unequivocally states that “childhood” yields objective conclusions,
independent of the mindset of any particular child. 107 The Miller Court describes
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences as
“hallmark features” of juveniles.108 Referencing the reasonable person standard in
Miranda cases in particular, even the state admits that some personal characteristics
are relevant to an objective custody analysis, like blindness.109 And the Graham
Court broadly declares that while a juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his

103. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
104. JUVENILE LAW CENTER, Juvenile Records: A National Review of State Laws on Confidentiality,
Sealing
and
Expungement
6,
http://juvenilerecords.jlc.org/juvenilerecords/documents/publications/national-review.pdf (2014).
105. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011) (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts § 10 cmt.
b (Am. Law Inst. 2005)).
106. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988) (plurality
opinion)).
107. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 275.
108. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).
109. J.D.B, 564 U.S. at 278
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actions, his transgressions are “not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” 110
The Court now recognizes that children, as a group, are less mature, more reckless,
highly influenced by peers and, at times, incapable of removing themselves from
horrific crimes.111
IV. THE “REASONABLE CHILD” AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Juvenile justice provides a system, separate and distinct from criminal justice,
which encourages the treatment and rehabilitation of delinquent kids 112 over
punishment, and where they can avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction.113
Prior to 1900, most child offenders over the age of seven were imprisoned with
adults.114 However, with society’s shifting views on juvenile delinquency, political
and social reformers around the turn of the 20th century began to create youth
reformatories to house delinquent juveniles—along with some orphans and homeless
children—away from adult convicts.115 States also created separate, less formal
adjudication systems where youths were no longer tried as adult offenders, and
judges could consider extenuating evidence outside of the legal facts surrounding the
crime or delinquent behavior.116
Later, Congress took corresponding steps in the furtherance of extending the
guardian or "parens patriae" role of the state to encourage positive change in
children engaged in criminal behavior. The 1938 Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
provided juveniles with special protections such as the right not to be jailed unless it
was necessary to secure their custody, safety, or community safety, and the right to
be separated from adults.117 The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act
of 1968 conditioned federal funds on the states’ development of plans designed to
address and curb juvenile delinquency in the community. The 1974 Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act—most recently authorized in 2002—intended to
encourage national standards for the administration of juvenile justice, 118 added
further protections including a requirement of "sight and sound separation" between

110. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 (plurality
opinion)).
111. “First, children have a “‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’” leading
to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. Second, children “‘are
more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers;
. . . and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.” Miller, 132 S. Ct.
at 2464.
112. Here, the term “delinquent” is used to describe kids who violate criminal laws or commit status
crimes.
113. United States v. One Juvenile Male, 40 F.3d 841, 844 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v.
Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990)).
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History
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Juvenile
Justice
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http://www.lawyershop.com/practice-areas/criminal-law/juvenile-law/history (last updated Oct. 6, 2015).
115. See Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 (No. 2) Harv. L. Rev., 104, 107 (1909).
116. Id. at 108.
117. Rudolph Alexander, Jr., Federal Juvenile Justice Act, 14 J. FOR JUV. JUST. AND DETENTION
SERVICES 63, 63 (1999).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 5602(a)(5) (1974). Paragraph 5, including the “develop and encourage the
implementation of national standards” language, was removed when this statute was amended in 2002.
42 U.S.C. § 5602(a) (2002).
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youth and adult offenders in detention centers, 119 and a prohibition on placing youth
who had committed status offenses120 in a juvenile or adult detention facility. 121
Despite these commendable accomplishments by the federal and state
governments to take care of children at risk, it cannot be forgotten that the authority
of the juvenile justice system comes from its power to enforce criminal statutes.
Stated alternatively, the juvenile justice system may burden children’s liberties, even
with the intent of benign intervention, only when they have broken the law. The
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, applicable to the federal and state governments,
respectively, provide that no person can be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. In Gault, the Court held that juvenile adjudications, just
like adult criminal trials, must “measure up to the essentials of due process.”122 It is
a fundamental principle of due process that in order to prove its case, the government
must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.123 While the
juvenile justice system has adopted special features clustered around adjudication
procedures and dispositional consequences, the standards for determining guilt in the
criminal and juvenile systems are identical.124 As the Court held in Winship, the state
must prove all elements of a criminal charge against a juvenile beyond a reasonable
doubt.125 And the state’s efforts to supply such proof will result in a constitutional
deprivation of interests if it is undertaken inappropriately.
Based on the recent Supreme Court holdings in J.D.B., Roper, Graham, and
Miller, due process in juvenile adjudications requires the state, when prosecuting a
child for an act that constitutes a crime with the mens rea element based a reasonable
person standard, to refer to a reasonable child. First, it is virtually undisputed that
the law should punish only culpable action.126 The Court in these cases said
repeatedly and expressly that children are less culpable than adults. And so, at the
most basic level, it would be inconsistent with the Court’s holdings to compare
children to reasonable adults to measure to measure their culpability. To do
otherwise would nullify the authority of the juvenile justice system.
Second, the state typically relies on circumstantial evidence as proof of intent. 127
According to the Court and the scientific data on which it partly relied, children are
more impetuous and susceptible to outside pressures. Therefore, the acts of a child
and any surrounding circumstances simply cannot be understood, nor may inferences

119. 42 U.S.C. §5633(a)(13).
120. Juvenile status offenses are acts in which an adult may legally engage that are considered illegal
if performed by a minor. Common examples include running away, ungovernability, truancy, violating a
city or county curfew, underage possession and consumption of alcohol, and underage possession and use
of tobacco.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12).
122. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
123. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
124. Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 89, 132-33 (2009).
125. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 367-68.
126. Elizabeth Nevins-Saunders, Not Guilty As Charged: The Myth of Mens Rea for Defendants with
Mental Retardation, 45 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1419, 1428 n.30 (2012) (referring to Donald H. J. Hermann,
Mary Roberts & Howard Singer, Sentencing of the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 41 ARK. L.
REV. 765, 802 (1988)).
127. Carroll, supra note 17, at 558.
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be drawn upon them in the same manner that we do for adults. As held in In re
William G., a fact-finder’s interpretation of the riding of a shopping cart in a parking
lot must be different for children than for adults. 128
Third, an assertion that a person has the requisite intent to commit an offense
suggests that the person has the capacity for consciousness, choice, and control, 129
and the Supreme Court has stated that children are presumptively different from
adults in these capacities.130 With respect to consciousness, the Court held that kids
possess only incomplete ability to understand the world around them. 131 With
respect to choice, the Court said that juveniles lack capacity to exercise mature
judgment and has noted legal capacity laws, like smoking bans, 132 that secure kids
from hurting themselves by their own improvident acts. 133 And regarding control,
the Court declared that kids have less control, or experience with control, over their
environment, and they lack the freedom to extract themselves from criminogenic
circumstances.134 The reasonable person reference should reflect the age-appropriate
capacity for consciousness, choice, and control of the accused.
And fourth, due process assures that persons generally will not be held
criminally responsible unless they had notice of the illegality of their actions. First,
except for a limited list of status crimes, no person can be charged without fair notice
that his conduct is punishable.135 This notice requirement does not protect the acts of
a person who can prove they had no knowledge of the criminal statute they are
accused of violating.136 To the contrary, an awareness of social norms and
expectations can sufficiently provide a person with what will and will not be
acceptable behavior. But a reasonable adult will not have the same social awareness
as a reasonable child. The Court in J.D.B. stated that children lack experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental
to them,137 which again points to the need for the reasonable child reference.
The Due Process Clause also serves the goal of providing litigants a sense of
procedural justice.138 Indeed, the Court has held that a fairness requirement is part
of the Due Process Clause in juvenile adjudications.139 In addition to being
128. In re William G., 963 P.2d 287, 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
129. Nevins-Saunders, supra note 126 at 1428.
130. Supra, notes 109-112 and accompanying text
131. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S 261, 273 (2011).
132. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
133. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273 (citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
464–65).
134. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
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Due Process, http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/digest/IB6.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
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2016).
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constitutionally mandated, this feeling of fair treatment is critical to the effectiveness
of the juvenile justice system. In Gault, the Court referred to scientific studies
suggesting the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality, and
orderliness may be more impressive and more therapeutic for juveniles than an
informal court proceeding where a “fatherly judge” attempts to guide and help a child
“by paternal advice and admonition.”140 Most children would instinctively sense the
unfairness of being held to an adult standard of reasonableness.
It could be argued that in moving from a reasonable adult standard to a
reasonable child standard, kids will not be held responsible for their actions. But,
kids will be found criminally responsible for their acts when their negligent behavior
deviates from what would be expected from a reasonable person at their age. And,
there are other avenues for making kids pay for their misdeeds including the tort
system and school discipline.
The over-application of juvenile justice contact does not serve the goals of the
system or of society. Arrests and any resultant sanctions do not deter delinquent
behavior and may instead exacerbate it.141 Adolescent delinquency has been shown
to be unrelated to adult employment,142 but being sanctioned for such behavior,
however, can be related to increased chances for unemployment.143
Finally, despite the good intentions of the juvenile justice system, the collateral
consequences of a juvenile adjudication could outweigh any benefits of the state’s
benevolent interposition of its power. The services kids would receive as part of
their disposition and other appropriate sources of support would still be available.
And, kids who are adjudicated have difficulty obtaining employment, serving in the
military, or obtaining financial aid for college. 144 These burdens are at odds with the
goals of rehabilitation and the realization of a law-abiding adult life.
V. EXPRESS STATUTORY ADOPTION OF THE REASONABLE CHILD
STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the science establishing an adolescent’s
diminished culpability and transitory nature leaves two approaches to consider 145
when a system attempts to incorporate this jurisprudence into the adjudication
process of children accused of negligence offenses. The first is to use the holdings
as grounds to argue over the subjective ability of the accused juvenile to meet the
reasonable person standard as it is currently described and understood (the
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reasonable adult).146 The second is to revise the objective standard itself. 147 Here,
we argue for the latter. In specific, we suggest that state statutes—and the language
of the MPC—defining a “reasonable person” as the reference point for criminal
negligence for juveniles must be updated to expressly refer to a “reasonable child.”
Our rationale is, in summary, that this change is necessary to achieve compliance
between juvenile justice and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the goals of the
juvenile system, the constitutional basis upon which the juvenile system is
authorized, and society’s understanding of adolescence and culpability. Statutory
recognition validates the discretion of law enforcement officers, corrections officers,
DAs, and judges to divert kids participating in low-level delinquency to receive
support and make restitution for any harm they may have caused in a manner that
does not disrupt what will most probably be their natural maturation toward crimefree adult behavior.148 A reasonable child standard properly empowers defense
attorneys to argue that their clients’ acts do not reach the level of culpability
sufficient to trigger intervention by the state. A statutory change undertaken by the
legislatures dispenses with the aversion of the courts to make a policy-oriented
change on their own in response to the Supreme Court’s holdings, but without the
endorsement of elected representatives. And, absent stronger sealing or
expungement options, this shift to the reasonable child standard is the most effective
way to shield children from unfair, counterproductive lifelong collateral
consequences. We now address each one of these reasons in more detail.
With the Court’s forcible reiteration in Roper, Graham, J.D.B., and Miller of the
reduced culpability of children, it is arguably inconceivable that participants in
juvenile adjudications would continue to compare children’s behavior with that of a
reasonable adult at any stage in juvenile court proceedings. 149 This conclusion is
especially compelling when the Court in J.D.B. has explicitly declared the
requirement for a reasonable child standard in Miranda cases.150 While the holdings
in these cases pertain to sentencing and the custody test in the Miranda analysis, the
Court does not set any limitations on the points along the course of a juvenile
proceeding at which the science to which it referred is relevant. It is hardly farfetched to apply the Court’s beliefs on children’s culpability to the proof or disproof
of the mens rea element of an alleged crime which is precisely at the point where we
assign or reject culpability, when diminished culpability is now the Court’s operative
jurisprudential theory.151 But, while the neuroscience about the development of
juvenile’s brains is undeniably based on data collected about individual children, the
Supreme Court’s holdings in these four self-referential cases are about children as a
class. The Court repeatedly and forcefully made statements, demonstrating its belief

146. See Carroll, supra note 17, at 594.
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149. See Carroll, supra note 17, at 576 (“These studies are relevant not only to a calculation of
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rea as a signifier of culpability.”).
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in the relevance of neuroscience to general propositions as to the normal
developmental course of adolescence. 152 Therefore, these cases do not obviously
stand for the proposition that their holdings or the neuroscience is mandatory, or even
generally applicable for the subjective ability of individual kids, in juvenile
adjudications. In addition, the neuroscientific techniques may not be reliable enough
to make individual evaluations of culpability. 153 Such evaluations may also be
impractical or inconsistently available due to cost and time considerations. This is
not to say that it is improper to make these subjective arguments, nor is it a prediction
that the science will not advance to a point such that this approach becomes more
suitable. While some may still cling to a narrow reading of the Court’s holdings as
only pertaining to Miranda custody analysis and sentencing, it would be
inharmonious with the Court’s clear support for reduced culpability to judge a
juvenile as culpable based on his inability to conform with adult expectations, but
then to later deem the adolescent offender inculpable as an adult for purposes of
punishment,154 and this “effort at containment” of the reduced culpability doctrine is
likely to weaken over time.155 Such a limited use of the science fails to address the
underlying dilemma that the assessment of culpability was flawed in the first
place.156 Even scholars who argue for cautious use of the science acknowledge that,
in Graham, the Court made clear that the general developmental principles
underlying Roper are relevant to any aspect of doctrine relying on assumptions about
youths' attributes and capacities,157 and that group-level assessment as to juveniles'
relative immaturity is, indeed, relevant to the construction of mens rea statutes that
incorporate external norms, such as negligence and recklessness. 158 It may be argued
that, by incorporating features of the accused into the character of the reasonable
person, we will inappropriately convert a metric that is intended to function
objectively into a subjective one. But the consideration of age in juvenile
adjudications is analogous to in tort cases, where “[a]ll American jurisdictions accept
the idea that a person's childhood is a relevant circumstance” where liability turns on
what an objectively reasonable person would do in the circumstances. 159 To the
contrary, to ignore age could make the objective inquiry of reasonableness more
artificial.160 The Court in J.D.B. held “that courts can account for that reality without
doing any damage to the objective nature of the [Miranda] custody analysis.”161
Additionally, factfinders have a wide basis of community experience upon which it
is possible, as a practical matter, to determine what is to be expected of children. 162
It may also be suggested that courts should wait for the Court to explicitly rule on
how the brain science should change how we approach mens rea in a juvenile case.
But, even before Roper, some states relied in part on the developmental neuroscience
152.
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to eliminate the juvenile death penalty, 163 and criminal negligence is a considerably
less heinous offense.
Next, the juvenile justice system is founded on the well-appreciated differences
between children and adults, and on society’s support for treating children differently
as a group. It is, therefore, congruous with the traditions of this system to set a
separate bar of reasonableness for children as a class. There are rare instances,
particularly for violent crimes, where our society wishes children to be appraised as
adults. These children are removed from the juvenile system and subsequently
“bound over” to the adult criminal justice system so that they can be evaluated
according to adult standards of culpability. The plain implication of this approach is
that the standards to which children are held accountable in the juvenile system are
different than those for adults, and it is only under extraordinary circumstances that
we choose to evaluate their behavior as adults. Further, the primary goal and purpose
of the juvenile system is to promote rehabilitation. Children passing through a
normal stage of adolescence164 are not in need of rehabilitation. It would be an
anathema to that system to label as “criminal” what is, in fact, a transitory and a
necessary component of eventual development into adulthood that allows individuals
to understand socially created boundaries and to live within them. 165 Some may
worry that raising the bar for the criminal culpability of kids will allow them to get
away with delinquency, reduce their motivation to conform to societal norms, or
make society less safe. But, we do not suggest that biological or neurological
realities exclusively control behavior. 166 There are obviously times where people, at
any age, grossly deviate from reasonable behavior such that state intervention is
authorized, and the state should have a full opportunity to prove that is the case. The
ultimate goal in formally adopting a reasonable child standard is not to absolve kids’
responsibility for actions, but to be more accurate as to what we label as criminal
behavior. Finding children criminally negligent when they lack the capacity to
understand the risk that they are taking, is punishing them for their incapacities, not
their bad minds.167 Even if a child’s behavior does not rise to the level of criminal
negligence, there are still other ways to have them make restitution for any harm they
may have caused. And, interactions with the juvenile system may perpetuate
delinquent behavior.168 Critics of a reasonable juvenile standard could say that there
are already points in the juvenile justice process where a child’s age can be properly
accommodated such as the decision to arrest a child in the first place, whether to file
a petition, or whether to divert a case. The constitutional due process rights of
163. Maroney, supra note 124, at 169.
164. See id. at 97.
165. Carroll, supra note 17, at 581.
166. Id. at 588.
167. Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1440.
168. Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, Diversion Programs: An Overview (Sept. 1999),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html. An analysis of a police diversion program found that
diversion appeared to aggravate rather than deter recidivism (Lincoln, 1976). Elliott, Dunford, and
Knowles (1978) found that intervention, whether received in a traditional juvenile justice setting or in an
alternative program, resulted in an increase in levels of perceived labeling and self-reported delinquency
among youth. Two other studies supported this finding (Lincoln, 1976; Lipsey, Cordray, and Berger,
1981). Other concerns raised about diversion programs include those related to prejudice, discrimination,
civil rights violations, and the issue of net widening.
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children should not be left to the discretion of state agents. Other critics may argue
that the setting of 18—or any age—as the cut-off between adolescence and adulthood
is arbitrary, or alternatively that kids nearing 18 look enough like adults to be
expected to behave as such. But, the employment of 18 as demarcation is entirely
consistent with many other areas in law (like minimum voting age), and the brain
research shows that immature decision-making capacity lasts well beyond the age of
18.169
The recent diminished culpability jurisprudence of the Court gives rise to
another potential constitutional issue. If jurisdictions continue to employ an adult
standard of reasonableness to measure children’s mens rea, it could give rise to an
argument that the use of this antiquated standard is a violation of a juvenile’s due
process, and lead to sentences challenged as cruel and unusual punishment contrary
to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.170 The Court in McKeiver—citing
Winship and Gault—recognized that the constitutional standard for due process in
juvenile proceedings is fundamental fairness. 171 Fundamental fairness cannot be
satisfied by gauging children’s behavior according to the adult world where the norm
is compliance.172 Children as a class do not have the awareness of adult levels of
care nor are they equipped to achieve them. This does not preclude a defense
attorney from presenting evidence using neuroscientific methods to argue that an
individual child did not have the capacity to achieve a reasonable standard of care,
or a DA to refute such evidence. Regardless of any subjective evidence that may be
discussed, the objective standard to which they refer, moving forward, should be that
of a reasonable child and to do otherwise would extend the state’s authority beyond
the boundaries set by the constitution. “[T]he negligence standard is constitutionally
permissible because it approximates what the due process guarantee aims at: an
assurance that criminal penalties will be imposed only when the conduct at issue is
something society can reasonably expect to deter,” 173 and the “same characteristics
that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be
less susceptible to deterrence.”174 But again, given that the Court’s opinions are more
strongly grounded in observations about children as a group, the constitutional
necessity of evaluating a child’s subjective capacity for negligence is less sustained.
Next, the shift to a reasonable child standard for criminal negligence is
fundamental to society’s continuing commitment to treat children differently and to
society’s expectation for the role of mens rea elements in the definitions of crimes.
Even the dissent in Graham acknowledges that “[o]ur society tends to treat the
average juvenile as less culpable than the average adult.” 175 The deep systemic
changes enacted in the juvenile justice system in the 1990s in response to fears of

169. Maroney, supra note 163, at 152 (“[S]tructural maturation is not complete until the midtwenties.”).
170. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972); see also State v. Marshall, 692 P.2d 855, 857
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that a 15-year-old boy does not need to act as a reasonable adult or risk a
criminal conviction); J.R. v. State, 62 P.3d 114, 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
171. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
172. See Carroll, supra note 17, at 549.
173. State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 884 (Alaska 1997).
174. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
175. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 117 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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juvenile “superpredators” remain largely in place. “In important respects, the
juvenile system became indistinguishable from the adult one, and the benefits it
retained became available to fewer young persons.” 176 An explicit reference to a
reasonable child in the criminal negligence statutes would be a step toward regaining
some of the ground lost for kids. This reference is also needed to repair the role of
mens rea. Reliance on an adult mens rea standard for youthful offenders, in the face
of overwhelming scientific evidence supporting the unjustness of this comparison,
undermines mens rea’s value.177 Many states recognize incompetency as a safety
net for a child’s behavior that, though damaging, is not blameworthy. 178 To ignore
the legal gap between a competency determination and a child’s inability to reach a
reasonable adult standard to form criminal intent is to choose ease of prosecution
over fundament fairness. Some citizens may feel they are safer by “broadening the
net” of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over delinquent behaviors. As discussed
above, interactions with the juvenile system fuel delinquency and disrupt what would
otherwise be the natural maturation into crime-free adult behavior. “Adults bear a
special responsibility to provide youth with adequate opportunities to reach their
potential, no matter what they have done.” 179 We are not suggesting that we raise
the bar of culpability for the worst offences but instead for the least serious. Society
and the courts have long endorsed the doctrine that criminal negligence liability
should be harder to prove than tort negligence. 180 If the criminal system does not
endorse a reasonable child standard analogous to that in torts, then the converse
situation could result. Some citizens may worry that the retribution role of the
juvenile courts, even if it is secondary to rehabilitation, will be diluted if it becomes
harder to adjudicate kids. This retribution is not being applied fairly. In 2009, the
delinquency case rate for males was 2.5 times greater than the rate for females. 181
While white youth made up 78% of the U.S. population under juvenile court
jurisdiction,182 the total delinquency case rate for black juveniles (103.2) was more
than double the rate for white juveniles (40.3).183 Black youths are more likely to be
detained, especially for drug offense cases. 184
With a reasonable child standard, kids accused of negligence crimes would no
longer have to rely on the common sense of law enforcement personnel, corrections
officers, DAs, and judges about the normalcy of delinquent behavior. Right now,
the decision not to charge or ultimately adjudicate a child accused of a negligence
176. Maroney, supra note 163, at 102.
177. Carroll, supra note 17, at 544.
178. National Conference of State Legislatures, Juvenile Justice: States with Juvenile Competency
Laws
(Oct.
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/states-with-juvenilecompetency-laws.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
179. Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
765, 793 (2011).
180. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
181. National Center for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Court Statistics 2009 14 (2012),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239114.pdf.
182. Id. at 19 (noting that the makeup of the U.S. population under juvenile jurisdiction in 2009 was
16% of black youth, 1% of American Indian youth, and 5% of Asian youth).
183. Id. at 20 (demonstrating delinquency case rates of (50.9) for American Indian youth and (14.2)
for Asian youth).
184. Id. at 33.
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crime based on the intuition that this is “just a kid being a kid” depends on the
benevolent compassion of the decision-makers in the juvenile decision. There are
several points along the course of a juvenile proceeding where the concept of a
reasonable child should and, to some extent, perhaps already does inform and
influence the outcome. But, decision-makers typically will have only partial
information at early, pretrial stages about either the child or the circumstances of his
offense.185 Considering these four recent cases and their use of neuroscience as a
reinforcement of the Court’s commitment to the special legal status of youth,186 it is
time to give express legal stature to the decision process of people who determine
the fate of kids in the juvenile system. This does not mean that kids will not be held
responsible for harms they may have caused. They are still subject to school
discipline systems and the civil courts. They can still interact with victims advocates
and the restorative justice system as a means to resolve any outstanding issues. The
opportunity still remains for kids in need of support to be referred to the appropriate
providers and agencies. Criminal negligence may still be found even when a child
acts with a sincere good faith belief that his actions pose no risk, as long as the
factfinder determines that his belief was unreasonable for an ordinary and reasonably
prudent child of similar age.187 Some may argue that diversion provides the properly
balance between state intervention and informality. But, any interaction with the
juvenile justice system generates records that can result in collateral consequences.
And, diversion programs can aggravate rather than deter recidivism, and raise levels
of perceived labeling and self-reported delinquency among youth. 188
A statutory change to the reasonable person reference would give the legislative
blessing to formally apply the reasonable child standard that some state courts have
already begun to entertain.189 This change would have the additional benefit of
creating a more consistent treatment of the defendant’s age within a single
proceeding. For example, a court would not refer to an objective reasonable child
standard in the Miranda analysis, and then the reasonable adult standard in the trial.
In State v. Heinemann, the court may not have issued the awkward holding that a
defendant’s age could be used to differentiate him from those threatening him when
considering a duress defense, 190 but could not use age as a factor to determine how
he would have perceived any threats regardless of the age of his alleged coercers. It
is also possible to wait for the courts to interpret the ramifications on their own, and
the Graham Court created more “breathing room” for the lower courts to do so. 191
However, there would be many children unfairly assessed in the meantime, and some
courts might still resist applying adolescent brain science given how deeply the
existing doctrinal forces are entrenched.192 Many states still have significant punitive
components in their juvenile delinquency codes. This trend to treat children charged
185. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474 (2012).
186. Maroney, supra note 145, at 767.
187. In re Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 514 (Minn. 1979).
188. The Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, Diversion Programs: An Overview (Sept. 1999),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html.
189. See In re William G., 963 P.2d 287, 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
190. State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278, 295 (Conn. 2007).
191. Maroney, supra note 145, at 784.
192. Maroney, supra note 124, at 145.
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with crimes more like adults grew rapidly in the 1990s due to a spike in gun violence.
Unfortunately, most of these laws are still on the books. 193 We could face a similar
situation, just as when some courts were wrestling with the “troubling questions” of
juvenile life without parole.194 There would also be inconsistent treatment of kids195
in a manner incongruent with the Supreme Court’s reduced culpability doctrine that
might be very difficult to appeal.
The reasonable child standard will empower defense attorneys to provide the
best and most appropriate advocacy for their clients. When appropriate, defense
counsel could present evidence to describe the reasonable child and how they would
act in the circumstances. But, factfinders need no training in science to account for
a child’s age, and may instead rely on a “wide basis of community experience upon
which it is possible to . . . determine what is to be expected of children.” 196 Critics
of this standard change might suggest the more correct statutory response to the brain
science would be to add a new means to challenge the state’s ability to prove the
mens rea element of the crime of which a child is accused. For example, the Maine
criminal statutes provide that the defense may introduce evidence of an abnormal
condition of the mind to raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a required
culpable state of mind.197 But, the brain science does not defensibly support
individual evaluations of mental state at this time, 198 and so challenges of individual
variation may hinder its relevance and impact.199 Adolescence is not something that
needs to be proved, nor is infancy a defense. The juvenile justice system is not the
place to handle normal childhood delinquency. The admission of testimony
regarding adolescent development should not depend on a legislative
modification,200 other than formal adjustment of the proper negligence reference
point.
Another problem with a case-by-case approach is that it does not take into account
of special difficulties encountered by counsel in juvenile representation . . . [where]
[j]uveniles mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal justice
system and the roles of the institutional actors within it, . . . [and] are less likely than
adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense.201

The statutory adoption of a reasonable juvenile negligence standard puts what
is, indeed, a policy change properly into the hands of the legislature, and the
193. Maroney, supra note 124, at 102.
194. People v. Pratcher, No. A117122, 2009 WL 2332183, at *44 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2009); see
also State v. Allen, 958 A.2d 1214, 1236 (Conn. 2008).
195. Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1452 (“Case-by-case adjudication does not allow a single, coherent
solution to the problem.”).
196. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 284A, at 15).
197. 17-A M.R.S. § 38 (2016).
198. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (“[I]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to
differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and
the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 573 (2005)); Maroney, supra note 124, at 146 (“The most significant current limitation of
developmental neuroscience is its inability to inform individual assessment.”).
199. Maroney, supra note 124, at 146.
200. See Carroll, supra note 17, at 592.
201. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.
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adolescent brain research offers an appropriate basis for legal decisionmakers
performing a policymaking function such as this to treat youth as a group in a
particular way.202 In some instances, the adoption of the Court’s doctrine is the role
of the lower courts, and some may suggest that the line-drawing between relevant
and irrelevant subjective characteristics that may be ascribed to a reasonable person
best is left to those institutions,203 or in the extreme that resolving in the abstract all
of the possible personal traits may be ascribed to the reasonable person may be too
daunting for any legislative reform.204 Adjudication has advantages over the
legislative process because the courts’ “duty to do justice,” coupled with the public
nature of decisions made on the record, affords a level of transparency not available
in the legislative process.205 Unfortunately, the courts’ treatment of reduced juvenile
culpability has been inconsistent, and without uniform guidance from courts, “we
cannot hope for a uniform, predetermined solution” to the identity of the reasonable
juvenile.206 Despite frequent arguments on behalf of juvenile defendants, courts have
been reluctant to rely on neuroscience outside of sentencing mitigation. 207 There is
also an economic factor that favors legislation; the need to continually litigate
adolescent development issues for individual cases will have a significant resource
cost—time and money—for defenders, prosecutors and courts.208 Additionally,
legislatures are unquestionably in the best position to reverse the sweeping policy
changes of the last two decades.209 Laws enacted by the state legislatures around the
country is the most reliable objective signal of contemporary values. 210 Without a
categorical rule, juveniles run the risk that the particulars of their case will overpower
“youth” as a matter of course,211 as it did pre-Roper, “even where the juvenile
offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should
require a sentence less severe than death.”212
Finally, with the significant collateral consequences of interaction with the
juvenile system,213 it is fair and legitimate to formally change the objective standard
behavior to that of a reasonable juvenile. Even juvenile charges can have devastating
“ripple effects” on a child’s access to education, housing, and military careers, and

202. See Maroney, supra note 124, at 167.
203. Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1437.
204. Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1452.
205. Michael, supra note 9, at 1452-53.
206. Id. at 1454.
207. See Carroll, supra note 17, at 589 (“Likewise, time and time again, lower courts have remained
unmoved in the face of scientific evidence challenging the transfer of juveniles to adult courts, the
imposition of adult sentences, and the application of adult-calibrated mental states to juveniles.”).
208. Expert testimony alone averages $351.00 per hour for case review, $456.00 per hour for
depositions and $488.00 per hour for court time. Joseph O’Neill, Expert Witness Fees: An Infographic
(Sept.
23,
2016),
https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/expert-witness-fees/.
209. See Maroney, supra note 124, at 152.
210. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322-23 (2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331
(1989)).
211. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010),
212. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). Note that here the Court was talking about
sentences of life without parole for a non-homicide crimes.
213. Julie Ellen McConnell, supra note 24, at 36
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can influence the outcome of future proceedings, 214 particularly for black males.215
Weak or non-existent sealing or expungement laws, bolstered by the eternal memory
of the Internet, mean that interactions with the juvenile system may never go away. 216
More fundamentally, over-adjudication has the potential to derail the otherwise
natural progression of a delinquent youth into a law-abiding adult.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a line of recent cases that have rocked the world of juvenile law, the Supreme
Court relied on both the latest adolescent development research and the timeless
knowledge of parents to forcefully and repeatedly state that children are more
impetuous, more vulnerable to outside pressures, less depraved, and less culpable for
their actions than adults.217 Despite this stance, criminal negligence statutes
continue to refer to the “reasonable person” standard, which does not take into
account the age of the accused, as the benchmark for guilt or innocence. In doing
so, we hold children to, at the very least, an irrelevant and arguably unfairly
demanding behavioral ideal by criminalizing normative adolescent behavior. This
result is entirely inconsistent with the Court’s holdings that require special treatment
for juveniles in the custody analysis for Miranda cases and during sentencing.
Delinquency is a normal stage of adolescent behavior, particularly for boys, from
which the vast majority age out. 218 Furthermore, records of juvenile adjudications
can have lifelong, negative collateral consequences on children’s educational,
employment, housing, and military opportunities and, as such, subvert the
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile system.
In this article, we argue that states' juvenile codes and the MPC should be
amended to explicitly refer to a reasonable child standard for any mens rea element
that relies on a reasonable person as the measure for criminal culpability. This
statutory change is necessary to achieve uniformity between the functioning of the
juvenile justice system and the Supreme Court’s modern doctrine of reduced juvenile
culpability. The change is needed to reestablish the constitutional authority of the
system, to explicitly validate the discretion that law enforcement officers, corrections
officers, DAs, and judges already employ to accommodate age, and to avert the
214. Id. at 34; see also Youth in the Justice System: An Overview, JUV. L. CTR., http://jlc.org/newsroom/media-resources/youth-justice-system-overview (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); see also Maine, THINK
BEFORE YOU PLEA (Nov. 21, 2015, 9:31 PM), http://www.beforeyouplea.com/?q=me, for information
specific to Maine.
215. Diversion Programs: An Overview, supra note 19 (emphasizing that minority youth are
disproportionately affected by diversion).
216. See THINK BEFORE YOU PLEA, supra note 214 (“If a juvenile has been adjudicated as having
committed a juvenile crime, people who directly supervise the health, behavior, or progress of that
juvenile have access to arrest records if the information is made available for creating a rehabilitation plan
for the juvenile. This includes school officials (the principal and the principal’s designates) who have
access to a juvenile’s arrest records upon adjudication if the school officials are or might become
responsible for the juvenile’s health and welfare, and if the information is being distributed as part of the
juvenile’s school reintegration plan . . . . If the juvenile is adjudicated to have committed a crime involving
a motor vehicle, the court will automatically send the juvenile’s name, offense, date of the offense, date
of the adjudicatory hearing, and any other relevant facts to the Secretary of State.”).
217. Supra note 112
218. See Maroney, supra note 124, at 97.
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potentially devastating collateral consequences that any juvenile record may yield.
As the Supreme Court has vigorously recognized, “[a] child's age is far ‘more
than a chronological fact.’”219 It is time for a new approach to mens rea analysis for
juveniles that is consistent with what we know from our experience, with the latest
brain research science, and with the current jurisprudence of the highest court in the
land.

219. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115 (1982)).

